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inducing customer loyalty and thus foreclosing the relevant market for its competitors 
through (i) a rebate scheme and (ii) direct payments, both of which the Commission 
qualified as abuses of dominance under article 102 tFEU. The General Court upheld 
the Commission decision in its entirety in June 2014. Before the Grand Chamber of 
the Court of Justice, however, the General Court’s Intel judgment was set aside and 
the case was referred back to that Court. The Court of Justice held that where the 
Commission, as in its Intel decision of 2009, also relies on an as-efficient-competitor 
(aEC) test in order to assess the capability of a rebate scheme to restrict competi-
tion contrary to article 102 tFEU, the General Court must review a party’s counter-
arguments pertaining to this economic analysis. The General Court was instructed to 
further examine the factual and economic evidence in this respect.
With a view to illuminating the legal questions that posed themselves in Intel, the 
present contribution reviews the leading European case law on rebate schemes – 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin I and II, British Airways, Tomra and Post Danmark II 
– as well as the Commission’s approach to conditional rebates in its 2009 Guidance 
Paper. after briefly recalling the different stages of the Intel case, the contribution then 
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the way in which the Court attempted to reconcile its formalistic case law on rebate 
schemes with the effects-based economic tests carried out by the Commission.
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1. Introduction
on 6 September 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union deliv-
ered its long-awaited Intel judgment. The European Commission had 
accused intel of inducing customer loyalty and thus foreclosing the rel-
evant market for its competitors through (i) a rebate scheme and (ii) direct 
payments to original equipment manufacturers (oEMs) and a distributor. 
The Commission qualified both practices as an abuse of dominance under 
article 102 tFEU. While the General Court dismissed intel’s appeal of 
the Commission decision in June 2014, its own judgment was set aside by 
the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice and – in an unexpected turn 
of events – the case was referred back to the General Court. The Court of 
Justice held that where the Commission, as in its Intel decision of 2009, 
also relies on an as-efficient-competitor (aEC) test in order to assess the 
capability of a rebate scheme to restrict competition contrary to article 
102 tFEU, the General Court must review a party’s counter-arguments 
pertaining to this economic analysis. The General Court was instructed to 
further examine the factual and economic evidence in this respect.
in the following, a short tour d’horizon (section 2) of the European 
case law on rebate schemes and the European Commission’s economic 
approach to rebates provides the necessary background to discussing 
the implications of the Intel case (section 3). after recalling the various 
stages of the case, this contribution focuses on the Court of Justice’s recent 
Intel judgment and the way in which that Court attempted to reconcile 
its case law on loyalty-inducing rebate schemes with effects-based eco-
nomic tests relied upon by the Commission. Three insights can be gained 
from the Court’s Intel judgment (section 4): one good, one bad and one 
ugly.1 While the Court’s judgment gave some much-needed legal guidance 
on how to assess the capability of rebate schemes to restrict competition 
(“the good”), it also left several legal questions on EU competition law’s 
approach to rebate schemes unanswered (“the bad”). legal uncertainty as 
1 These conclusions have nothing in common with Clint Eastwood’s blockbuster movie except for 
their title.
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to the legal test for rebate schemes under EU competition law is thus set 
to be prolonged – for intel and beyond (“the ugly”). Section 5 closes with 
some final reflections on rebates after Intel and on the aEC test as a reliable 
standard in EU competition law. 
2. The competition law assessment of rebates before Intel
rebates are an everyday feature of business life. They are generally viewed 
favourably as they reduce price – one of competition law’s central goals. 
However, under certain circumstances a company with sufficient mar-
ket power may rely on rebates in order to foreclose competitors from the 
market, thus harming the process of competition and, in due course, con-
sumer welfare.2 article 102 tFEU prohibits rebates that induce customer 
loyalty and thereby foreclose competitors, although it remains the issue of 
intense debate what the legal assessment of loyalty rebates should look like 
under EU competition law. observers had pinned high hopes on the Intel 
case to solve this question. in the following, the leading European case 
law on rebates is discussed in order to gain a better understanding for the 
legal questions that were at issue in Intel, with the European Commission’s 
Guidance Paper of 2009 intersected as a possible game changer for future 
cases. readers familiar with these cases may wish to directly proceed to 
section 3.
2.1. Leading case law predating the Guidance Paper
From its early years onwards, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
issued a number of leading judgments on the contentious legal issue of 
how competition law should deal with rebates by dominant companies. 
Volume-based quantity rebates have consistently been regarded as permis-
sible under the competition rules, as long as they relate to real cost sav-
ings and to individual orders.3 loyalty rebates which are conditioned on 
2 on the possible anti-competitive effects of rebates, see Julie Clarke, “The opinion of aG Wahl in the 
intel rebates case: a triumph of substance over form?”, World Competition: Law & Economics Review 
40, no. 2 (2017): 242 ff. on the link between foreclosure and consumer harm, see also European 
Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the Treaty 
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, 2009 oJ C45/7, paragraph 19.
3 This is a finding which the Courts have repeated since the late 1970s; see Judgment of 13 
February 1979, Hoffmann-La Roche v. Commission, 85/76, EU:C:1979:36, paragraph 90; Judgment 
of 9 November 1983, Michelin v. Commission (Michelin I), 322/81, EU:C:1983:313, paragraph 72; 
Judgment of 6 october 2015, Post Danmark v. Konkurrencerådet (Post Danmark II), C23/14, 
EU:C:2015:651, paragraph 28 (holding that “a simple quantity rebate [should be] linked solely to 
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exclusive dealing, on the other hand, have traditionally been presumed 
to constitute an abuse of a dominant position under article 102 tFEU. 
to begin with, in the Hoffmann-La Roche case (1979), the Court held that 
exclusive purchasing obligations as such constitute an infringement of 
article 102 tFEU, whether or not they are rewarded with rebates. in a 
similar vein, fidelity rebates set on an individual basis that do not con-
tain a formal tying arrangement, but require the customer to obtain all or 
most of its requirements from the dominant undertaking, also constitute 
an abuse of a dominant position.4 The reason for this finding is that these 
fidelity rebates are both “designed to deprive the purchaser of or restrict 
his possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other producers access 
to the market.”5 The Court noted that while fidelity rebates were normally 
incompatible with the internal market, exceptional circumstances such as 
those relevant for individual exemption under article 101(3) tFEU should 
be taken into account in their assessment.6 By this, the Court opened up 
the possibility of objective justification for fidelity rebates.
in the Michelin I case of 1983, the Court further developed its stance on 
loyalty rebates as potential abuses of a dominant position. at issue were 
selective and individual target-based rebates with long reference periods.7 
The Court held that loyalty rebates ensured that purchasers did not turn 
to other suppliers for their purchasing requirements, thus constituting an 
abuse under article 102 tFEU.8 it distinguished the rebates in Michelin 
I from those in Hoffmann-La Roche, as the former entailed no explicit 
exclusive purchasing requirement for Michelin’s heavy vehicle replace-
ment tyres.9 The Court went on to list the circumstances which one had to 
assess when analysing whether such a rebate scheme was loyalty-inducing 
and thus abusive within the meaning of article 102 tFEU, namely the 
conditions for granting the rebate and whether it is liable to restrict the 
purchasers’ ability to choose their sources of supply or to foreclose com-
petitors’ access to the market, whether the rebate scheme applies dissimilar 
the volume of purchases, […] granted in respect of each individual order, thus corresponding to 
the cost savings made by the supplier.”).




7 Judgment of 9 November 1983, Michelin I, 322/81, EU:C:1983:313, paragraphs 81-83.
8 Ibid., paragraph 71.
9 Ibid., paragraph 72.
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conditions to equivalent transactions and whether it reinforces the domi-
nant company’s market position.10
Following these landmark judgments by the Court, the General Court 
was given several opportunities to weigh in on the antitrust assessment of 
rebates. in Michelin II (2003), the General Court found that loyalty rebates, 
through their exclusivity-enhancing nature, can lead to a foreclosure effect 
and therefore infringe article 102 tFEU.11 The rebates granted by Michelin 
in that case were quantity rebates which the Commission considered to 
have a loyalty-inducing effect.12 one of Michelin’s lines of defence was to 
argue that its rebate system did not have such a foreclosure effect in prac-
tice, and that the Commission should have analysed the actual economic 
effect of its rebates on the market.13 The General Court did not side with 
Michelin on this question, finding that effect under article 102 tFEU was 
not to be understood as actual effect, but rather as conduct that “tends to 
restrict competition or […] is capable of having that effect.”14 it then held 
that under article 102 tFEU, object and effect are one and the same, and 
that conduct which had the object of limiting competition was also liable to 
have such an effect.15 as Michelin’s discount system was designed to tie the 
purchasers to it and this “tended to restrict competition”, the Commission 
had proven anti-competitive effect to the required legal standard.16
The General Court was again called upon to determine the compatibil-
ity of a rebate scheme with article 102 tFEU in British Airways (2003). 
in that case, British airways had offered rewards for reaching sales tar-
gets to travel agents, and its system included retroactive rebates with long 
reference periods.17 The General Court showed an inclination to also 
assess whether those schemes actually induced customer loyalty, and, if 
so, whether there was an objective justification for them.18 However, at a 
later stage the General Court returned to its familiar formalistic approach, 
10 Ibid., paragraph 73.







17 Judgment of 17 december 2003, British Airways v. Commission, t-219/99, EU:t:2003:343, para-
graphs 282-284.
18 Ibid., paragraph 271.
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holding that the Commission was not required to show actual effects 
on the market resulting from the rebate schemes. it was enough if the 
Commission showed that the rebate schemes tended to restrict compe-
tition or were capable of having an anti-competitive effect.19 on appeal, 
British airways argued that the General Court should have assessed the 
probable effects of its commissions, or take account of the evidence show-
ing that they had no material effect. British airways’ appeal was dismissed 
by the Court, however, which stated that rebates which were neither quan-
tity rebates nor fidelity rebates within the meaning of Hoffmann-La Roche 
had to be analysed with regard to their capability to produce exclusion-
ary effects.20 it held that the General Court had rightly found the bonus 
schemes to be loyalty-inducing.21
overall, the Court’s and General Court’s case law on rebate schemes 
subjects rebates to a mainly “qualitative analytical framework”22 which 
has been characterised as formalistic.23 it regards loyalty-inducing rebates 
granted by dominant undertakings as an abuse contrary to article 102 
tFEU because it sees them as inherently capable of leading to a distortion 
of competition. This distortion is achieved through the rebates’ influence 
on purchasers’ freedom to purchase from whomever they choose, which 
is mirrored by the foreclosure of the dominant company’s competitors. 
The requisite legal standard to which the Commission needs to prove 
anti-competitive effects has repeatedly been held to consist of a likely 
tendency or capability to restrict competition. There is no need to dem-
onstrate actual effects on the market; potential effects (thus a capability 
to produce actual effects) are sufficient. This is considered an appropriate 
legal standard in the light of the special responsibility24 that companies 
with considerable market power have towards the competitive situation 
on the relevant market. This line of case law is often called form-based or 
formalistic because it presumes (possible or likely) competitive harm from 
19 Ibid., paragraph 293.
20 Judgment of 28 September 2006, Van den Bergh v. Commission, C-552/03  P, EU:C:2006:607, 
paragraph 68.
21 Ibid., paragraph 98.
22 Nicolas Petit, “intel, leveraging rebates and the goals of article 102 tFEU”, European Competition 
Journal 11, no. 1 (2015): 36.
23 Sofia oliveira Pais, “os descontos de exclusividade numa encruzilhada”, in Estudos em 
Homenagem ao Conselheiro Presidente Rui Moura Ramos (lisbon: almedina, 2016, vol i), 1221.
24 See, for instance, Judgment of 9 November 1983, Michelin I, 322/81, EU:C:1983:313, paragraph 57.
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the form of the rebates rather than focusing on the rebate scheme’s actual 
effects on the market.
2.2. Rebates in the Commission’s 2009 Guidance Paper 
in February 2009, the European Commission issued a Guidance Paper on 
its enforcement priorities concerning exclusionary abuses under article 
102 tFEU.25 This was preceded by a discussion Paper (2005) on the same 
questions.26 While some argue that the Commission should only rely on 
the Guidance Paper in order to decide which cases to pursue,27 the pre-
vailing view is that the Guidance Paper will henceforth inform the anal-
ysis that the Commission carries out with respect to exclusionary abus-
es.28 in addition, it has been cautioned that in any case, companies align 
their market behaviour with the Commission’s standard, rather than the 
Court’s.29 This may ultimately make the question of enforcement priorities 
v. substantive guidance obsolete in practice.
The Guidance Paper contains a section exclusively dedicated to con-
ditional rebates (paragraphs  37-46), in which the Commission explains 
based on which parameters it wants to select and analyse these rebates 
going forward.30 it starts from the premise that conditional rebates aim to 
reward buyers for their (favourable) purchasing behaviour, either through 
25 European Commission, Guidance Paper.
26 in this discussion Paper, the Commission made public some first reflections on a modernization 
of its approach to exclusionary abuses. Section 7.2.2 of that Paper (paragraphs 151-176) concerned 
conditional rebates. European Commission, DG Competition discussion paper on the application 
of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses (2005).
27 This argument is, of course, supported by the title of the Guidance Paper, which only refers to 
enforcement priorities rather than to substantive guidance. on prioritization v. substantive guid-
ance, see Wouter P. J. Wils, “The Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the so-called more 
economic approach to abuse of dominance”, World Competition: Law & Economics Review 37, 
no. 4 (2014): 408, 409; richard Whish, “Intel v. Commission: Keep calm and carry on!”, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 6, no. 1 (2014): 2 (highlighting that the Guidance Paper was 
not relied upon when selecting the Intel and Tomra cases, as the initiation of the latter predated 
the former).
28 Similarly, see Paul Nihoul, “The ruling of the General Court in Intel: towards the end of an 
effect-based approach in European Competition law?”, Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice 5, no. 8 (2014): 521; Giorgio Monti, “article 82 EC: What future for the effects-based 
approach?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1, no. 1 (2010): 5.
29 Brian Sher, “Keep calm-yes; carry on-no! a response to Whish on Intel”, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 6, no. 4 (2015): 220.
30 For a summary of its as efficient competitor test, see also Nicholas Banasevic and Per Hellström, 
“When the chips are down: Some reflections on the European Commission’s intel decision”, 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1, no. 4 (2010): 307-308.
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retroactive rebates or incremental ones. if granted by a company with sub-
stantial market power, conditional rebates may lead to anti-competitive 
foreclosure.31 The Commission regards them as a pricing abuse.32 The 
Guidance Paper does not condemn exclusivity rebates as such, but only 
in the case that they produce exclusionary effects.33 For this reason, the 
Commission holds that a number of factors should be considered when 
assessing the foreclosure effects of a rebate scheme:34 First of all, there are 
general factors that should form part of the analysis of any kind of exclu-
sionary abuse, such as the market position of the dominant company, of its 
competitors and of its customers and suppliers, the conditions prevailing 
on the relevant market, the extent of the exclusionary conduct, possible 
evidence of actual foreclosure, and direct evidence of any exclusionary 
strategy.35 Secondly, there are factors specific to conditional rebates to be 
considered, namely the ability of as-efficient-competitors to compete for 
the contestable share of demand,36 and the retroactive nature of a rebate.37 
in particular, the Commission intends to analyse whether a conditional 
rebate scheme “is capable of hindering expansion or entry even by compet-
itors that are equally efficient.”38 it will do so by calculating the price which 
a competitor would need to offer to the dominant company’s customer 
in order to compensate it for losing the conditional rebate made available 
by the dominant company. This effective price is calculated for the rel-
evant range, i.e. that portion of demand which a customer can direct away 
from the dominant company.39 The rebate’s exclusivity-inducing effect is 
stronger the lower the price offered by the competitor needs to be in order 
to compete for the relevant range of demand. The Commission assumes, 
however, that prices above long-run average incremental cost (lraiC) 
allow an as efficient competitor to compete profitably,40 while prices below 
31 European Commission, Guidance Paper, paragraph 37.
32 Monti, “article 82 EC”, 4.
33 Petit, “intel”, 41.
34 European Commission, Guidance Paper, paragraph 38.
35 Ibid., paragraph 38 referring to paragraph 20.
36 Ibid., paragraph 39.
37 Ibid., paragraph 40.
38 Ibid., paragraph  41. More generally, the Commission regards conditional rebates as part of 
price-based exclusionary conduct, and intends to analyse them accordingly; see ibid., paragraph 
41 referring to paragraphs 23-27.
39 Ibid., paragraph 41. The relevant range also depends on the kind of rebate offered by the domi-
nant company; see ibid., paragraph 42.
40 Ibid., paragraph 43.
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average avoidable cost (aaC) are capable of foreclosing as efficient com-
petitors.41 The Commission will also take into account whether a rebate 
is individualised or standardised, with the latter sometimes regarded as 
less harmful.42 as the Commission points out, it will take objective justi-
fications based on efficiency into account provided they are passed on to 
customers.43 
aG Kokott has warned that even if the Commission adapted its deci-
sion practice based on its Guidance Paper, it continues to be bound by 
the Court’s interpretation of article 102 tFEU.44 in Post Danmark II, the 
Court reaffirmed that the Guidance Paper merely sets out the enforcement 
priorities of the Commission as a competition authority, and binds nei-
ther national competition authorities nor courts.45 Nevertheless, by rely-
ing on the effects-based spirit of the Guidance Paper in the cases it brings, 
the Commission is in a position to try and advance its economics-minded 
mission.
2.3. First case law after the Guidance Paper: tomra and Post danmark ii
The first rebate case to stand the test of the Commission’s more economic 
approach to article 102 tFEU was Tomra. The Commission adopted its 
Tomra decision in 2006, i.e. after publishing its discussion Paper but 
before issuing its Guidance Paper on article 102 tFEU. tomra had relied 
on exclusivity agreements, individualised quantity commitments and 
individualised retroactive rebate schemes in order to increase sales for its 
reverse vending machines.46 although it considered it sufficient, under 
established case law, to demonstrate that a rebate tends to restrict compe-
tition, the Commission also analysed the likely effects of tomra’s rebates 
on the market for reverse vending machines.47 Upon appeal, the General 
Court held that this additional analysis carried out by the Commission 
41 Ibid., paragraph 44.
42 Ibid., paragraph 45.
43 Ibid., paragraph 46. it has been criticised, however, that the exact circumstances of when the 
Commission might accept such arguments are “rather cryptic”; see damien Geradin, “loyalty 
rebates after Intel: time for the European Court of Justice to overrule Hoffman-La Roche”, Journal 
of Competition Law and Economics 11, no. 3 (2015): 587.
44 advocate General Kokott’s opinion of 14 april 2011, Solvay v. Commission, C-109/10  P, 
EU:C:2011:256, paragraph 21.
45 Judgment of 6 october 2015, Post Danmark II, C23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paragraph 52. on this see 
already European Commission, Guidance Paper, paragraph 3.
46 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra v. Commission, t155/06, EU:t:2010:370, paragraph 11.
47 Commission decision of 29 March 2006, Prokent-Tomra, CoMP/E-1/38.113, paragraph 332.
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did not constitute the basis for its finding of an infringement of article 
102 tFEU, and that therefore it did not need to assess the accuracy of this 
additional economic analysis. rather, the General Court again emphasised 
that it was enough to show that the rebates in question were capable to pro-
duce anti-competitive effects; proof of actual effects was not required.48 
Capability to have an anti-competitive effect was therefore confirmed as 
the legal benchmark by which rebates are assessed. tomra’s appeal to the 
Court was dismissed in 2012, and the Court re-emphasised the General 
Court’s reliance on capability to restrict competition as the applicable legal 
test.49 in particular, the Court agreed that no price/cost analysis had to be 
carried out in order to prove the anti-competitiveness of the individualised 
retroactive rebates at issue.50 The economic argument that certain rebates 
had no effect on the market was therefore defeated by the legal argument 
that they were capable of having an anti-competitive effect,51 without the 
need to engage in quantitative economic tests.
in a preliminary ruling of 2015, the Court got another opportunity to 
revisit its case law on rebates in the light of the Guidance Paper’s econom-
ics-based approach. in Post Danmark II, the referring danish court had 
specifically asked the Court to give it some legal guidance on the relevance 
of the aEC test for assessing rebates, and mentioned the Guidance Paper 
in order to substantiate its question on the relevance of less efficient com-
petitors.52 While it did not directly set out three categories of rebates – as 
the General Court had done in Intel (see below) –, one can easily read the 
following three categories into the Court’s Post Danmark II judgment: (1) 
quantity discounts linked solely to the volume of purchases and related to 
individual orders, which are regarded as legal, (2) loyalty rebates which are 
presumed to constitute an abuse of a dominant position, and (3) other types 
of rebates.53 in the case of third category rebates, all the circumstances of a 
case need to be taken into account in order to determine whether a rebate 
scheme is contrary to article 102 tFEU.54 For these rebates, it needs to be 
shown that an anti-competitive effect is likely; a merely potential effect is 
48 Judgment of 9 September 2010, Tomra v. Commission, t155/06, EU:t:2010:370, paragraph 289.
49 Judgment of 19 april 2012, Tomra v. Commission, C549/10 P, EU:C:2012:221, paragraph 68.
50 Ibid., paragraph 73.
51 ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases, 5th ed. (oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2016), 256.
52 Judgment of 6 october 2015, Post Danmark II, C23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paragraph 20.
53 Ibid., paragraphs 27-29.
54 Ibid., paragraph 50.
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sufficient in this regard.55 importantly, the Court noted that in the case 
of third category rebates, an undertaking in a dominant position should 
be allowed to demonstrate that any alleged anti-competitive effects are 
counterbalanced or even outweighed by efficiencies, similar to an analy-
sis under article 101(3) tFEU.56 The Court also emphasised that the as-
efficient-competitor (aEC) test may constitute a useful analysis within the 
context of article 102 tFEU, although it is not as such required by the 
(case) law.57 it is merely “one tool amongst others”.58
These two rebate cases were closely followed as they could have sealed 
the fate of the aEC test. Tomra, for one, needs to be regarded as a failed 
attempt at introducing a more economics-based analysis into this area of 
the law. Considering that the case was initiated when the debate on the 
Guidance Paper merely got started, this does not necessarily reflect on the 
Guidance Paper’s power to induce a more economics-based approach into 
the antitrust assessment of rebates. Post Danmark II, on the other hand, was 
decided several years after the adoption of the Guidance Paper, and a year 
after the General Court had dismissed intel’s appeal of the Commission 
decision.59 Post Danmark II saw the aEC test favourably mentioned and 
accepted as one possible analytical tool. This can certainly be regarded as 
a first tentative step by the Court in the Commission’s effects-based direc-
tion. However, the Court was quite clear that other types of analysis were 
(at least) equally valid. Some even labelled Post Danmark II a “great disap-
pointment” for those who wanted to see the aEC test morph into proper 
good law.60 Nevertheless, it certainly allowed the Commission’s new eco-
nomics-based approach a foot in the door in the realm of rebates, without 
opening it all the way.
55 Ezrachi, EU Competition Law, 263.
56 Judgment of 6 october 2015, Post Danmark II, C23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paragraphs 47-49.
57 Ibid., paragraphs 57-58. Thereby, it has been argued, the Court agreed with the General Court’s 
stance on the aEC in its Intel ruling; see Miroslava Marinova, “Should the rejection of the ‘as 
efficient competitor’ test in the Intel and Post Danmark II judgments lead to dismissal of the effect-
based approach?”, European Competition Journal 12, no. 2-3 (2016): 392.
58 Judgment of 6 october 2015, Post Danmark II, C23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paragraph 61.
59 See below, section 3.2.
60 Björn lundqvist, “Post Danmark II, now concluded by the ECJ: Clarification of the rebate abuse, 
but how do we marry Post Danmark I with Post Danmark II?”, European Competition Journal 11, 
2-3 (2015): 573.
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3. The intel case (so far): shaping the future of loyalty rebates
Good things come to those who wait – at least that might be intel’s mantra 
at the moment. its rebate case has been going on for almost two decades, 
and there is no end in sight. a short overview shall help place the major 
milestones in the Intel case on the time horizon: The Intel case was initi-
ated by a complaint that intel’s competitor aMd lodged with the European 
Commission in the year 2000.61 on 26 July 2007, the European Commission 
started official proceedings against intel by sending the company a state-
ment of objections concerning rebates that intel was alleged to have relied 
upon in order to induce loyalty among its customers. This statement of 
objections was supplemented on 17 July 2008. after the Commission fined 
intel by decision of May 2009,62 the General Court rejected its appeal in 
June 2014. intel appealed the General Court’s judgment and, by the time 
advocate General (aG) Wahl delivered his opinion in october 2016, the 
antitrust community was anxiously awaiting the Court of Justice’s final 
judgment in the case, which was rendered on 6 September 2017. today, we 
stand in front of a judgment that answers some legal questions but raises 
many more – and rather than deciding the Intel case for good the Court 
of Justice remanded it back to the General Court. in the following, the 
different chapters of the Intel saga are discussed in turn, culminating in a 
discussion of the most recent judgment.
3.1. The Commission’s decision
The European Commission issued its Intel decision on 13 May 2009, levy-
ing a then-record EUr 1.06 billion fine for two abuses of a dominant mar-
ket position, the first of which will be examined hereafter. This abuse was 
a rebate scheme for a number of oEMs (dell, lenovo, HP and NEC) and 
a distributor. intel’s rebate scheme was said to foreclose competitors by 
requiring the oEMs to buy (most of) their central processing units or 
CPUs from intel, or the distributor not to stock computers which did not 
contain CPUs by intel.63 
61 a second complaint followed in 2003; see Commission decision of 13 May 2009, Intel, 
CoMP/C-3/37.990.
62 a few weeks after the decision was issued, the European ombudsman found that the European 
Commission had acted against principles of good administration in its investigation; see Decision 
of the European Ombudsman of 14 July 2009 closing his inquiry into complaint 1935/2008/FOR 
against the European Commission.
63 Commission decision of 13 May 2009, Intel, CoMP/C-3/37.990. For a summary of the deci-
sion, see 2009 oJ C227/13. The second abuse (“naked restrictions”) were payments to oEMs so 
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The Commission acknowledged that its Guidance Paper was not applica-
ble to the Intel case, as it was issued after the statements of objections were 
handed to intel. Nevertheless, it considered that its Intel decision was fully 
in line with the considerations in the Guidance Paper,64 as detailed above. 
relying on the terminology used in its Guidance Paper, the Commission 
referred to conditional rebates in its decision. 
The first part of the Commission’s analysis relied on the Court’s case 
law, holding that conditional rebates such as the ones granted by intel 
constituted an infringement of article 102 tFEU. it rebutted intel’s 
assertion that the case law required a demonstration of actual foreclo-
sure in order to find an infringement of article 102 tFEU, referring to 
the General Court’s judgments in British Airways and Michelin II in 
which the General Court had relied on capability to have anti-compet-
itive effects as its legal test.65 it underlined that this analysis was suffi-
cient for finding an infringement.66 The Commission’s analysis based on 
this “formalistic” case law has been criticised by commentators close to 
intel.67 However, this criticism appears to brush aside the fact that the 
Commission is indeed bound by this case law,68 meaning that its bifur-
cated analysis under both the case law and its own economic approach as 
outlined in the Guidance Paper might be the only way to advance its more 
economics-based approach under article 102 tFEU.
as to prevent or delay the sale of rival products. another facet of the intel case was the “proce-
dural arrogance” (luca Mazzone and alberto Mingardi, “innovation, competition and antitrust: 
an examination of the Intel case”, Economic Affairs 31, no. 2 (2011): 69) which the Commission 
was accused of, which led to a finding by the European ombudsman that the Commission had 
“infringed principles of good administration” by “failing to make an adequate written note of the 
meeting [with dell] of 23 august 2006, for the purposes of establishing agreed minutes of that 
meeting.” Decision of the European Ombudsman of 14 July 2009 closing his inquiry into complaint 
1935/2008/FOR against the European Commission.
64 Commission decision of 13 May 2009, Intel, CoMP/C-3/37.990, paragraph 916.
65 Ibid., paragraphs 919, 922 with reference to Judgment of 17 december 2003, British Airways v. 
Commission, t-219/99, EU:t:2003:343, paragraph 293 (direct quote); Judgment of 30 September 
2003, Michelin II, t-203/01, EU:t:2003:250, paragraph 239.
66 Commission decision of 13 May 2009, Intel, CoMP/C-3/37.990, paragraph 925, paragraphs 926-
1001 for the analysis.
67 damien Geradin, “The decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009 in the Intel case: Where is 
the foreclosure and consumer harm?”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 1, no. 2 
(2010): 113, 115. on Professor Geradin’s ties with intel, see Banasevic and Hellström, “When the 
chips are down”, 303 n 17.
68 Clearly acknowledging this limitation, see European Commission, Guidance Paper, paragraph 3.
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in addition to its legal analysis based on authoritative case law, the 
Commission carried out the as-efficient-competitor (aEC) test for each 
customer to which intel had granted rebates, and concluded that the 
rebates were capable of anti-competitive foreclosure effects.69 on over 150 
pages of the decision, the Commission thus set out to show, based on price/
cost factors, that intel’s rebate scheme was capable of causing, or likely to 
cause, foreclosure on the market for x86 CPUs.70 The aEC test carried out 
internally by intel reached the reverse conclusion, namely that its rebates 
were not capable of foreclosing as efficient competitors. in essence, intel 
and the Commission disagreed on the results from a test which is con-
ceptually one and the same, particularly as regards the delineation of the 
contestable share of the market for x86 CPUs.71
3.2. The General Court’s judgment
on 12 June 2014, the General Court dismissed intel’s appeal of the 
Commission’s infringement decision, a judgment which was controversial 
to say the least.72 its significance was understood to go far beyond the case 
at hand, having repercussions not only on the legal analysis of rebates under 
article 102 tFEU but also on the Commission’s more economics-based 
approach to single firm behaviour.73 The General Court based its analysis 
on a three-prong legal categorisation of rebates: (1) quantity rebates, (2) 
exclusivity rebates,74 and (3) third category rebates.75 This categorisation in 
turn relied on its reading of Michelin I and British Airways.76 While quan-
tity rebates refer to volume-based savings that the supplier passes on to his 
69 Banasevic and Hellström, “When the chips are down”, 304.
70 Commission decision of 13 May 2009, Intel, CoMP/C-3/37.990, paragraph 916, para-
graphs 1002-1640.
71 on this see Geradin, “The decision of the Commission”, 118.
72 Some have even referred to the judgment’s reception as hugely hostile; see Whish, “Intel v. 
Commission”, 1.
73 James S. Venit, “Case t-286/09 Intel v. Commission – The judgment of the General Court: all 
steps backward and no steps forward”, European Competition Journal 10, no. 2 (2014): 204.
74 Noting that the General Court’s reference to “exclusivity rebates” directly references the theory 
of harm that is seen in those rebates, much more so than the previously often used terms fidelity 
or loyalty rebates, see richard Whish and david Bailey, Competition Law, 8th ed. (oxford: oxford 
University Press, 2015), 770 n 97.
75 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraphs 74-88.
76 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraph 74; Judgment 
of 9 November 1983, Michelin I, 322/81, EU:C:1983:313, paragraphs 71-73; Judgment of 15 March 
2007, British Airways v. Commission, C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, paragraphs 62-68.
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customer and are generally viewed as legitimate, exclusivity rebates are 
conditional upon the customer obtaining all or most of its requirements 
from the dominant company and are presumed to be anti-competitive by 
the case law. Third category rebates, then, are rebates that are not explicitly 
conditioned upon exclusive dealing but are nevertheless loyalty-inducing. 
only the latter call for an assessment of all the circumstances of the case, 
in the view of the General Court.77 This categorisation essentially regards 
exclusivity rebates as abuses of dominance by object – to use terminology 
borrowed from article 101 tFEU –, and third category rebates as abuses of 
dominance by effect. Necessarily, this has implications for the legal assess-
ment of these types of rebates. a similar – albeit less forceful – wording 
was adopted by the Court of Justice a year later in Post Danmark II, where 
it held that in the case of third type rebates all the circumstances of a case 
had to be assessed in order to determine whether a rebate scheme was 
capable of restricting competition.78
The General Court found that the rebates at stake in Intel concerned 
exclusivity rebates of the second category,79 and that these “are by their 
very nature capable of restricting competition”80 and of tying customers 
to the dominant company81 – thus making an analysis of their (potential) 
effects irrelevant. as exclusivity rebates “automatically satisf[y]” the crite-
rion of capability, it makes little sense to engage in an elaborate economic 
analysis of actual effects.82 Thus, the General Court ruled that where a 
dominant company grants an exclusivity rebate, the rebates’ actual effects 
on competition do not have to be assessed.83 Exclusivity rebates granted by 
dominant companies will normally bring about the effect which they are 
intended to bring about, and consequently they are seen as inherently anti-
competitive without any further need to prove actual effects. The General 
Court held such exclusivity rebates to be “incompatible with the objective 
of undistorted competition”84 on the internal market. This objective, it has 
77 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraph 78.
78 on this, see already above at section 2.3 and Judgment of 6 october 2015, Post Danmark II, 
C23/14, EU:C:2015:651, paragraphs 28-29.
79 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraph 79.
80 Ibid., paragraph 85.
81 Ibid., paragraph 86.
82 Nihoul, “The ruling of the General Court in Intel”, 523.
83 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraph 103.
84 Ibid., paragraph 77. See also Wils, “The judgment of the EU General Court in Intel”, 424.
M&Clr_ii_1.indd   29 26/04/2018   10:03:40
30  Market and Competition Law Review / volume ii / no. 1 / april 2018 / 15-45
been held, is the ultimate goal which necessarily needs to guide any eco-
nomic approach to article 102 tFEU.85
as the Court has done in previous cases, the General Court considered 
that exclusivity rebates “are designed to remove or restrict the purchaser’s 
freedom to choose his sources of supply and to deny other produ cers access 
to the market.”86 it suffices if access to the relevant market is made more 
difficult for competitors through the exclusivity rebate, market access does 
not have to be made altogether impossible.87 as the aEC test can only con-
firm the latter, the General Court considered that it was not necessary to 
carry it out.88 The General Court thus understands the abuse of a domi-
nant position in the case of rebates to go beyond what the aEC test can 
ascertain, and as a consequence the aEC test is regarded as too narrow 
and thus not applicable.
The General Court’s judgment tries to show that considerations of an 
economic nature do play into its analysis, for instance by referring to the 
possibility for the dominant undertaking to leverage its power over the 
non-contestable share of the market for its own benefit in the contesta-
ble share.89 By this, it has been said, the General Court highlights that an 
“economic theory of harm underpins the prohibition of dominant firms’ 
rebates.”90 However, this did not lead it to regard economics-based tests as 
a necessity. it also relied on Tomra for its argument that the aEC test was 
irrelevant for the purposes of exclusivity rebates.91 
The General Court held that in order to find that an exclusivity rebate 
amounts to an abuse under article 102 tFEU, it is not necessary to show 
that it is capable to restrict competition in a specific case; all the circum-
stances of a case only need to be assessed for third category rebates.92 For 
the General Court, the capability to produce anti-competitive effects is 
85 Ibid., 417; see also p. 420 on the integration of legal and economic analysis. Holding against this 
that “early per se intervention does not serve the goal of protecting the competitive process” in 
cases in which the competitive effects of a certain business behaviour are not known, see Patrick 
rey and James S. Venit, “an effects-based approach to article 102: a response to Wouter Wils”, 
World Competition: Law & Economics Review 38, no. 1 (2015): 23.
86 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraph 77.
87 Ibid., paragraph 88.
88 Ibid., paragraph 150.
89 See ibid., paragraphs 92-93.
90 Petit, “intel”, 37. This, however, means that only those exclusivity rebates which lead to leverag-
ing are covered by the strict legal standard prohibiting rebates as such; see ibid., 37, 43.
91 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraph 153.
92 Ibid., paragraphs 81-84, 143.
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sufficient consideration of effects as regards dominant undertakings – 
“anticompetitive effects were clearly produced by the practices adopted 
by intel.”93 This case law of the General Court – and the cases preced-
ing it – has been called effects-based, though perhaps not in the way that 
Chicagoan economics would see fit.94 The General Court further held that 
no aEC test needs to be carried out to support the conclusion that a rebate 
is anti-competitive, neither for exclusivity rebates nor for third category 
rebates.95 The Commission does not need to prove direct damage to con-
sumers, nor a causal link between consumers’ damage and the exclusivity 
rebates under investigation, as article 102 tFEU also discourages anti-
competitive practices which may affect consumers through their “impact 
on an effective competition structure”.96
The General Court distinguished exclusivity rebates from abusive pric-
ing practices, holding that it is not the level of the price as such which is 
seen as abusive in the case of rebates, but the exclusivity which flows from 
them.97 Some commentators have commended this approach, underlining 
that the harm to competition that flows from exclusivity rebates is differ-
ent from the harm that predatory pricing brings about.98 aG Wahl, how-
ever, disagrees with this differentiation.99
While the General Court’s Intel judgment has been said to be fully in 
accordance with the line of case law starting with Hoffmann-La Roche, 
critics have called for this case law to be replaced with a more effects-based 
reading of article 102 tFEU.100 an aspect of the judgment which was widely 
commented on – and criticised – was the fact that the General Court held 
that there was no de minimis threshold for abuses of a dominant position, 
93 Nihoul, “The ruling of the General Court in Intel”, 528.
94 Ibid., 530.
95 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraphs 144, 146, 153.
96 Ibid., paragraph 105 with reference to Judgment of 15 March 2007, British Airways v. Commission, 
C-95/04 P, EU:C:2007:166, paragraph 106.
97 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraph 99.
98 Wils, “The judgment of the EU General Court in Intel”, 428. in selective price cuts, the Court 
had held price/cost tests to be applicable; see Judgment of 27 March 2012, Post Danmark v. 
Konkurrencerådet (Post Danmark I), C-209/10, EU:C:2012:172, paragraphs 35-38.
99 advocate General Wahl’s opinion of 20 october 2016, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14  P, 
EU:C:2016:788, paragraph 102.
100 Geradin, “loyalty rebates after Intel”, 597, 614; Venit, “Case t-286/09 Intel v. Commission”, 208-
209.
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so that even foreclosure from a relatively low share of worldwide demand 
(in intel: 14%) was seen as sufficient.101
3.3. Advocate General Wahl’s opinion
aG Nils Wahl delivered his opinion on intel’s appeal of the General Court’s 
judgment in october 2016. He scrutinised the General Court’s Intel judg-
ment very closely, suggesting to the Court that it should be annulled on a 
number of both procedural and substantive grounds. in the following, only 
his analysis of the rebates themselves will be scrutinised. He also regarded 
this as the central question which intel’s appeal posed to the Court: are 
loyalty rebates of the intel type inherently anti-competitive, meaning that 
it is not necessary to consider all the circumstances of the case in order to 
decide whether they are capable of restricting competition on the relevant 
market?102
intel refuted the General Court’s finding that its exclusivity rebates were 
inherently capable of restricting competition.103 The aG pointed out that 
the decisive question was: which was the correct legal test under which 
such loyalty rebates need to be analysed?104 The aG reached the conclusion 
that the relevant case law calls for an assessment of all the circumstances 
in all rebate cases, as the Court – particularly in Hoffmann-La Roche – has 
only ever made findings of unlawfulness after having carried out a com-
prehensive assessment of the legal and economic context (“all the circum-
stances” of the case in the terminology used under article 102 tFEU), i.e. 
the conditions under which rebates were granted and their market cov-
erage.105 This is also how the aG reads the Court’s preliminary ruling in 
Post Danmark II,106 although this is perhaps not the only possible reading 
of that case.107
101 Judgment of 12 June 2014, Intel v. Commission, t-286/09, EU:t:2014:547, paragraphs 116, 194. 
on this criticism, see Sher, “Keep calm-yes; carry on-no!”, 219; Venit, “Case t-286/09 Intel v. 
Commission”, 216-218; Whish, “Intel v. Commission”, 2; advocate General Wahl’s opinion of 20 
october 2016, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2016:788, paragraphs 137-146, 177.




105 Ibid., paragraphs 66, 68, 74.
106 Ibid., paragraph 76.
107 The following sections of Post Danmark II appear to suggest a reading more in line with the 
General Court in Intel: Judgment of 6 october 2015, Post Danmark II, C23/14, EU:C:2015:651, 
paragraphs 27-29. arguing that Post Danmark II should not be read in this way, see advocate 
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The aG did not concur with the General Court’s three-part catego-
risation of rebates, holding instead that the case law only distinguishes 
between two categories: volume-based rebates and all types of loyalty 
rebates. in the case of the latter, the aG recognised parallels with restric-
tions by object under article 101 tFEU.108
Concerning the General Court’s alternative assessment of the rebates’ 
capability to restrict competition, the aG strongly disagreed with the judg-
ment under appeal. He held that while the Commission does not need to 
show actual effects, its capability analysis must go beyond the hypothetical 
or theoretically possible. The terms “capability” and “likelihood” as used 
in the case law are one and the same.109 For a foreclosure effect to satisfy the 
legal standard of article 102 tFEU, it is not enough that it “appears more 
likely than not.”110 otherwise, this would amount to a legal standard based 
on the form of the conduct rather than its anti-competitive effects.111 The 
advocate General then assessed the General Court’s analysis against this 
background, finding that its assessment was not conclusive. in particular, 
he argued that while there was no legal obligation to rely on the aEC test, 
as the Commission carried it out it should not have been ignored.112
3.4. The Court of Justice’s landmark judgment
defying expectations and wishes on all sides – that the Court uphold the 
General Court’s Intel judgment113 or quash the Commission decision114 
General Wahl’s opinion of 20 october 2016, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2016:788, para-
graphs 104-105.
108 Ibid., paragraphs 81-82.
109 Ibid., paragraphs 114-115. There is no universal agreement on this; see Pablo ibáñez Colomo, 
“Comments on Case C-413/14 P, intel: Presumptions, effects-based analysis and open questions”, 
Chillin’Competition Blog, 2017, https://chillingcompetition.com/2017/09/06/comments-on-intel-
presumptions-effects-based-analysis-and-open-questions/. in any case, the Court’s judgment in 
Intel only refers to capability.
110 advocate General Wahl’s opinion of 20 october 2016, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14  P, 
EU:C:2016:788, paragraph 117.
111 Ibid., paragraph 118. For a critical assessment of this aspect of the opinion, see Clarke, “The 
opinion of aG Wahl in the intel rebates case”, 267.
112 advocate General Wahl’s opinion of 20 october 2016, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14  P, 
EU:C:2016:788, paragraphs 169, 170.
113 See, for instance, Whish, “Intel v. Commission”; Wils, “The judgment of the EU General Court 
in Intel”.
114 See, for instance, Geradin, “loyalty rebates after Intel”; Venit, “Case t-286/09 Intel v. 
Commission”; advocate General Wahl’s opinion of 20 october 2016, Intel v. Commission, 
C-413/14 P, EU:C:2016:788.
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–, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice decided to take a different 
path when it resolved intel’s appeal on 6 September 2017: in an unexpected 
and unusual turn of events, it set the General Court’s judgment aside and 
remanded the case back to the General Court after clarifying some – but 
by far not all115 – legal issues pertaining to the legal assessment of rebates 
under article 102 tFEU.
3.4.1. General remarks
The Court pointed out, first of all, that article 102 tFEU does not pro-
hibit the holding of a dominant position, but only its abuse. at the same 
time, article 102 tFEU does not intend to protect competitors which are 
less efficient than the dominant undertaking.116 The latter statement, it 
has been argued by intel counsel, paves the way for the logic underlying 
the aEC test.117 The Court then reiterated dominant undertakings’ spe-
cial responsibility to allow for genuine, undistorted competition on the 
European internal market.118 it referred to two infringements of article 
102 tFEU: pricing abuses that foreclose as efficient competitors, and con-
duct that strengthens a company’s dominant position “by using methods 
other than those that are part of competition on the merits.”119 Through 
this positioning, it appears that the Court considers loyalty rebates to 
form part of the broader category of pricing abuses, an abuse category for 
115 Bearing in mind the considerable length of the Commission decision (1,803), the General 
Court’s judgment (1,647 paragraphs) and even the advocate General’s opinion (349 paragraphs), 
the Court made do with a short judgment covering a mere 151 paragraphs. of these, only 19 para-
graphs concern the antitrust assessment of rebates. Just like market shares do not give a full picture 
of a company’s position on the relevant market, these numbers in themselves do in no way relate 
to the quality of the judgments. They indicate, however, that the Court’s judgment may have left 
a number of issues pertaining to the antitrust assessment of rebates unaddressed – issues which 
are to be resolved by the Court in the future. and indeed, the Court held that it did not need to 
address intel’s second, third and sixth ground of appeal; Judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v. 
Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraph 147.
116 Ibid., paragraph 133. However, see the Guidance Paper’s recognition that less efficient competi-
tors may, in some instances, also exert a competitive constraint; European Commission, Guidance 
Paper, paragraph 24. Similarly arguing in this vein, see oliveira Pais, “os descontos de exclusivi-
dade”, 1237.
117 James S. Venit, “The judgment of the European Court of Justice in Intel v. Commission: a pro-
cedural answer to a substantive question?”, European Competition Journal 13, nos. 2-3 (2017): 180.
118 Judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraph 135.
119 Ibid., paragraph 136.
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which it has previously held that all the circumstances of a case need to be 
assessed when analysing a company’s behaviour in this regard.120 
3.4.2. Clarification of Hoffmann-la roche
referring to Hoffmann-La Roche, the Court stated that exclusive dealing 
arrangements by a dominant supplier infringe article 102 tFEU, no mat-
ter whether or not a rebate is granted in exchange for an exclusive deal-
ing obligation. By the same token, loyalty rebates – which do not contain 
a formal exclusive purchasing obligation – breach article 102 tFEU.121 
in making this statement, the Court confirms one of the central tenets 
of Hoffman-La Roche, namely that such conduct continues to be legally 
presumed to be anti-competitive, i.e. capable of restricting competition.122 
While the Court did not explicitly refer to the three-prong categorisation 
of rebate schemes applied by the General Court in making these state-
ments, it only described rebates that belong to the second category which 
the General Court had made out, namely rebates which require the cus-
tomer to obtain all or most of its requirements from the dominant supplier. 
There is no mention of the third category of rebates, i.e. rebates without 
an exclusivity condition which may nevertheless be loyalty-inducing. This 
could indicate that the categorisation which the General Court deduced 
from the case law (particularly, Hoffmann-La Roche, Michelin I and British 
Airways) stands as a matter of principle, thus deciding against the aG’s 
recommendation in this regard. 
What follows (paras 138-141) is the Court’s “clarification” of the 
Hoffmann-La Roche case law: the Court’s more modern take on this vener-
able precedent. it pertains to rebate schemes which contain an exclusivity 
clause, and shows how the legal presumption that such a rebate scheme is 
abusive can be rebutted. The Court’s clarification applies to cases “where 
the undertaking concerned submits, during the administrative procedure, 
on the basis of supporting evidence, that its conduct was not capable of 
restricting competition and, in particular, of producing the alleged fore-
closure effects.”123 it is interesting to note at this point that this is precisely 
the argument that was made by the dominant company in the cases of 
120 See, for instance, Judgment of 17 February 2011, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige, 
C-52/09, EU:C:2011:83, paragraphs 28, 76.
121 Judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraph 137.
122 Similarly, see ibáñez Colomo, “Comments on Case C-413/14 P”.
123 Judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraph 138.
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Michelin II and British Airways – and which was back then rejected by the 
Courts. This clarification therefore reads like a considerable re-interpreta-
tion of the Courts’ own case law.
Where such a submission is made by the dominant company, the 
Commission is required to carry out an analysis of the rebates’ capacity 
to foreclose competitors. The Court names a number of factors which the 
Commission should take into account in such an analysis, namely “the 
extent of the undertaking’s dominant position on the relevant market, […] 
the share of the market covered by the challenged practice, as well as the 
conditions and arrangements for granting the rebates in question, their 
duration and their amount.”124 intent to exclude as-efficient-competitors is 
another factor that needs to be considered. For this last factor, the Court 
refers to Post Danmark I by analogy, a case which concerned selective price 
cutting.125 This can be seen as another indication that the antitrust assess-
ment of rebates is set to be more aligned with (other) pricing abuses.
in order to assess whether a rebate scheme may benefit from an objective 
justification, the Court states that same factors which need to be consid-
ered for assessing a rebate scheme’s capacity to foreclose are to be taken 
into account. in addition, however, efficiency may be relied upon to coun-
terbalance or even outweigh any foreclosure effect arising from the rebate 
scheme. The Court emphasises that objective justification is a separate 
analytical step that must only be carried out once it has been established 
that the rebate scheme at issue effectively has the capacity to foreclose 
as-efficient-competitors.126
3.4.3. Envisioning the practical application of the judgment
The Court seems to suggest (para 138) that the particular circumstances 
of the case which it lists in paragraph 139 are only to be analysed in the 
case that the dominant undertaking tries to rebut the presumption of ille-
gality by arguing that its conduct was not capable of restricting competi-
tion, based on supporting evidence. according to the Court, this submis-
sion on the part of the dominant undertaking would then have to incite 
the Commission to carry out an in-depth analysis of the factors men-
tioned. This leads to a situation in which the Commission makes a prima 
facie argument that a loyalty rebate scheme infringes article 102 tFEU 
124 Ibid., paragraph 139.
125 Judgment of 27 March 2012, Post Danmark I, C-209/10, EU:C:2012:172, paragraph 29.
126 Judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraph 140.
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(presumption of unlawfulness), upon which the undertaking concerned 
submits evidence that its conduct did not restrict competition – in par-
ticular because it did not foreclose competitors –, and only then would 
the Commission take into account all the circumstances of the case: the 
company’s market position, the market coverage of the rebate scheme, the 
specifics of the rebates at stake (conditions for granting them, duration, 
amount), and the existence or not of a foreclosure strategy. What is not 
clear is how detailed the dominant undertaking’s evidence, supporting its 
claim that its rebate scheme was not capable of restricting competition, 
needs to be. if that threshold is sufficiently low, then the initial presump-
tion of unlawfulness will in any case give way to an in-depth analysis of all 
the circumstances (“effects”). This is also what is suggested by first reac-
tions from law firms to the Intel judgment. it has been held elsewhere that 
there needs to be at least “a plausible claim […] that the dominant firm’s 
conduct may not have been capable of foreclosing its rivals”.127 is this what 
the Court intended to propose? if so, then the three-prong categorisation 
of rebates, which distinguishes between rebate schemes that are anti-
competitive as such (by object) or because they are loyalty-inducing (by 
effect), will be reduced to a two-prong categorisation as soon as the domi-
nant company submits evidence that its loyalty rebates were not capable of 
foreclosing as-efficient-competitors.128 This outcome would then be in line 
with the arguments of aG Wahl as discussed above.
in addition, it is unlikely that the Commission will make any claims 
as to the anti-competitiveness of rebate schemes without also considering 
(or indeed fully carrying out) the analysis of all the factors of the case as 
sketched out by the Court. More likely, the Commission’s first analysis 
will already incorporate these factors. This again erodes any distinction 
between rebates of the second and third category – if indeed, there ever 
was such a clear separation.
3.4.4. No pick and choose approach – even for the sake of completeness
if the Commission finds that a rebate scheme infringes article 102 tFEU, 
in an analysis of all the circumstances of the case based on the factors 
listed in para 139 in order to ascertain the conduct’s capability to foreclose, 
127 Venit, “The judgment of the European Court of Justice in Intel v. Commission”, 182.
128 in a similar vein, see Pablo ibáñez Colomo, “More on intel: Some thoughts after the iBa 
Conference in Florence”, Chillin’Competition Blog, 12 September 2017, https://chillingcompeti-
tion.com/2017/09/12/more-on-intel-some-thoughts-after-the-iba-conference-in-florence/.
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then it is for the General Court to “examine all of the applicant’s argu-
ments seeking to call into question the validity of the Commission’s find-
ings concerning the foreclosure capability of the rebate concerned.”129 in 
Intel, the Commission undertook a bifurcated analysis that was recalled 
above: one based on the case law and finding that intel’s rebate scheme 
was intrinsically capable of restricting competition, and another one based 
on the circumstances of the case, including an elaborate aEC test. The 
latter found that the rebate scheme was capable of foreclosing as-efficient-
competitors as they would have to offer prices below cost.130 From this, the 
Court concluded that the aEC test constituted an important element in 
the Commission’s analysis of the rebate scheme’s capability to foreclose.131 
Consequently, it was for the General Court to “examine all of intel’s argu-
ments concerning that test.”132 in its judgment, the General Court had not 
regarded the aEC test as of significance, and took into account neither 
the Commission’s execution of that test nor intel’s arguments pointing out 
faults in the Commission’s test.133 This error was sufficiently grave for the 
Court to set aside the General Court’s Intel judgment.134 as the Court con-
sidered that the state of proceedings did not allow it to give a final judg-
ment in the case, it referred the case back to the General Court. That Court 
was instructed to review the rebate scheme’s capability to restrict competi-
tion by relying on factual and economic evidence, and to take into account 
intel’s arguments in this respect.
The Court already gave a first indication that it views the aEC test as 
an acceptable tool within the sphere of rebates in Post Danmark II (see 
above). This was implicitly confirmed in Intel, where the Court set aside 
the General Court’s judgment based on its failure to take into account 
intel’s counter-argument to the Commission’s aEC test. However, Intel 
only clarifies that the General Court needs to review intel’s counter-argu-
ments to the Commission’s aEC test because the Commission carried it 
out. What it does not do is elevate the aEC test to a necessary element in 
the legal framework of rebates.
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While members of dG CoMP had suggested at the time when the 
Commission’s decision was published that Intel would showcase “how the 
Commission can combine established case law with a modern, effects-
based analysis”,135 it is fair to say that this experiment was not crowned 
with considerable success before the Court. rather to the contrary, the 
Court’s judgment demonstrates that the Commission, if relying on addi-
tional economic analysis which it is not required to engage in by estab-
lished case law,136 will also need to diligently respond to companies’ 
counter-arguments in that respect. it cannot at a later stage deny its own 
economic analysis and hope to win the case based on the Court’s case law 
alone.
3.4.5. de minimis threshold under Article 102 TFEU?
There are a number of issues which the Court did not address in its Intel 
judgment, most pressingly the question of a de minimis threshold for 
article 102 tFEU infringements. it did, however, list market coverage as 
one of the factors to be taken into account in an analysis of all the cir-
cumstances of the case.137 This might hint at the possibility that the Court 
understands a de minimis threshold to exist under article 102 tFEU, and 
the ball is now in the General Court’s court (quite literally) to further 
develop this notion.
4. Rebates after Intel: The good, the bad and the ugly
Three kinds of insights can be gained from the Intel case: one good, one 
bad, and one rather ugly.138 While the Intel Court gave some much-needed 
fresh legal guidance on how to assess rebates under EU competition law 
(“the good”), it also left several legal questions on the necessity to carry 
out economic tests such as the aEC test and their relationship with previ-
135 Banasevic and Hellström, “When the chips are down”, 301. on conflicting views within the 
Commission on this issue, see Venit, “The judgment of the European Court of Justice in Intel v. 
Commission”, 196-197.
136 Here, it is apt to recall Post Danmark II, where the Court clearly stated that the aEC test is but 
one possible analytical tool; Judgment of 6 october 2015, Post Danmark II, C23/14, EU:C:2015:651, 
paragraph 61.
137 Judgment of 6 September 2017, Intel v. Commission, C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632, paragraph 139.
138 it should be pointed out that Venit, in a recent contribution on Intel, used “The good and the 
bad” as a heading for his final remarks. This was only discovered by this author after submission 
of the title of her contribution to this journal. See Venit, “The judgment of the European Court of 
Justice in Intel v. Commission”, 197.
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ous formalistic case law on rebates unanswered (“the bad”). as the case 
was referred back to the General Court, the Intel case remains unresolved 
– thus entailing continued legal uncertainty for other rebate cases (“the 
ugly”). These three insights are discussed in more depth in the following.
Starting with the “good” in the Court’s Intel judgment, a positive aspect 
of the judgment certainly is the fact that it finally gives some legal guidance 
on certain aspects of the antitrust assessment of rebates. as the Court itself 
stated, its intention was to clarify (or rather, re-interpret) its longstanding 
case law. The judgment offers a middle ground between the old formalistic 
case law and an entirely effects-based approach: While the legal presump-
tion that a conditional rebate scheme is unlawful continues to stand, the 
Court has now shown how the company whose rebates are under scru-
tiny can rebut this presumption. in particular, the judgment shows that in 
cases where the Commission engages in laborious economics-based tests, 
those cannot be brushed aside as irrelevant at a later stage – neither by the 
General Court nor by the Commission itself. This also applies to the reli-
ance on the aEC test in rebate cases. The competition assessment of rebates 
as outlined in the Commission’s Guidance Paper has thereby started to get 
a hold in the case law. Intel was seen as a test case for the Commission’s 
Guidance Paper approach to rebates from its outset,139 and this perhaps 
also helps to explain the amount of attention this case has received.
Moving on to the “bad” – or some more critical reflections on the 
judgment –, it should be pointed out that the judgment leaves several 
legal questions unanswered. While the Court’s reasoning applies where 
the Commission actually engaged in economic benchmarking such as 
the aEC test, even if merely for the sake of completeness, it is less clear 
whether the Court’s findings on the way to assess a rebate scheme’s capa-
bility to restrict competition also apply more generally. Might the Court’s 
reasoning only apply where the Commission actually engaged in such eco-
nomic tests? The Court did not say that economic tests such as the aEC 
test constituted a necessary element of its legal test, and their relation-
ship with the Court’s previous formalistic case law on rebates, which had 
always focused on whether or not rebates induced or indeed were capable 
to induce loyalty among purchasers,140 remains at best ambivalent. While 
the General Court’s Intel judgment was on occasion called “the end for 
139 Monti, “article 82 EC”, 2.
140 See also ibid., 9.
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the Commission’s cost-based treatment of loyalty rebates”,141 the Court’s 
recent judgment does not altogether dismiss the aEC test as a valuable 
addition to the analysis of loyalty rebates. The question is, of course, which 
relationship will develop between the established case law and the aEC 
test. The Commission’s argument that it merely undertook the aEC test 
for the sake of completeness did, in any case, not convince the Court.
in addition, the Court did not clarify which legal standard should apply 
to the capability to foreclose competition, which aG Wahl had given so 
much thought to. another uncertainty relates to the three-part categori-
sation which the General Court had so clearly set out in its earlier Intel 
judgment, and which many commentators have read into the Court’s Post 
Danmark II judgment. This categorisation had appeared to organise the 
complex law on rebates into an object and an effects category. While aG 
Wahl was openly critical of this categorisation, holding that there were 
only two categories at stake – volume-based rebates and loyalty rebates 
from all walks of life –, the Intel Court appeared to circumnavigate this 
question by first focusing on loyalty rebates in the Hoffmann-La Roche 
tradition and then adjusting the analytical framework so that it now in 
any case resembles the “all circumstances of the case” approach which the 
General Court had deemed necessary for third type rebates only. 
a few remarks need to be made on the truly “ugly” side as well. as the 
Intel Court felt that it could not decide the case itself because the General 
Court had committed a serious error of law, the Intel case will be dragged 
on – possibly into its third decade. This also means that there is continued 
legal uncertainty for other rebate cases, as the question remains to which 
legal standard the European Commission has to prove the anti-competi-
tive nature of a rebate scheme under article 102 tFEU. ongoing or poten-
tial cases cannot rely on a clear analytical framework for legally assess-
ing rebate schemes under EU competition rules. it remains to be seen, of 
course, how the General Court will resolve the remanded case and how it 
will apply the Court’s legal guidance.
5. Final reflections
applying the aEC test that the Guidance Paper proposes in practice 
has been called “challenging”,142 to say the least. Tomra and Intel are 
141 ahmet F. Özkan, “The Intel judgment: the Commission threw the first stone but the EU courts 
will throw the last”, European Competition Journal 11, no. 1 (2015): 84.
142 Ezrachi, EU Competition Law, 247.
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perfect examples in point. The two cases have showcased how difficult it 
is to infuse the binding case law with more economics, and how such an 
attempt can ultimately lead to increased legal uncertainty for companies 
that want to grant rebates. While Intel was seen as an important milestone 
for the effects-based aEC test, it had been suggested in the literature that 
even if the Commission’s aEC test were to be rejected by the European 
courts, the EU’s competition watchdog “would suffer no set back as it was 
still applying, in parallel, the ‘settled case law’”.143 in the light of the highly 
unexpected outcome of the Court’s Intel judgment, one can now argue 
that it is because of the very fact that it carried out the aEC test that the 
Commission is now facing a potential defeat in this high-profile loyalty 
rebate case. in fact, it is somewhat ironic that there is a possibility that the 
Commission will ultimately lose its Intel case based on the aEC test which 
it added on to the established case law, but might have won it based on 
the Court’s precedent alone. The latter assertion may be questioned based 
on the Court’s hint that market coverage – and thus a sort of de minimis 
threshold – should be considered as a factor in the legal assessment: per-
haps the Commission’s Intel case was not as strong as it appeared to be at 
the outset, even without the addition of its economics-based analyses.
as a result of the Court’s Intel judgment a number of options for analys-
ing rebate schemes remain possible. although it is quite unlikely, it would 
theoretically be possible for the Commission to purely base its next rebate 
case on the Court’s formalistic case law.144 Would the Court accept such 
an approach, now that it has “clarified” its Hoffmann-La Roche case law in 
an effects-friendly way? The more challenging legal assessment, of course, 
would consist in consolidating the Court’s formalistic case law with its 
now “clarified” effects-based approach, whereby the Commission (and in 
due course the General Court) need to respond to an incumbent’s coun-
ter-arguments. Here, the question is whether legal presumptions – which 
often serve as short-cuts to swiftly reach the best outcome – will play any 
role in the future, or whether they are to be interpreted away in favour of 
an effects-based understanding.
Finally, it is worth re-considering the criticism that has been levied 
against the aEC test more generally. Such criticism includes the insight 
that loyalty rebates and predatory pricing do not relate to the same 
143 Nihoul, “The ruling of the General Court in Intel”, 530.
144 it has been cautioned that such a pick and choose approach would clearly go against equal treat-
ment; see Monti, “article 82 EC”, 10. This is now also confirmed by the Intel Court.
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anti-competitive harm, the notion that competition is not only based on 
price alone, and the warning that the modest benefits of the aEC test do 
not justify the significant investment of resources it requires. importantly, 
the aEC test is not in line with one of EU competition law’s fundamental 
objectives: undistorted competition.145 The aEC test has been found to be a 
useful indicator of whether a rebate scheme makes market access impossi-
ble altogether – but it does not serve any purpose when trying to establish 
whether market access for competitors is simply made more difficult.146 
as EU competition law also condemns rebates that achieve the latter, the 
aEC may not be the appropriate benchmark. in addition to that, the Intel 
case has shown that while both the Commission and intel were prepared 
to invest considerable resources into the aEC test, they could not agree 
on the contestable share of the market, leading to contradictory results 
based on the same conceptual framework. This, it should be stressed, is 
a problem that many if not most economics-based tests face. it certainly 
does not serve the swift administrability of the competition law rules, nor 
their predictability. This is not to say that the conceptual framework of 
the aEC cannot improve our understanding of the ways in which rebate 
schemes foreclose competitors – in fact, the contrary is the case. as a legal 
benchmark for the assessment of loyalty rebates, however, it does not cur-
rently seem to fit the bill as a workable standard. The lingering question is: 
what does?
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